Hacking Democracy / ETH Zurich, September 7, 2026Joshua C. Yang

Building
Digital
Democracy
in Practice

Build tools that give people a meaningful say.

Three illustrated people bringing different perspectives to a shared discussion board

Process examples, project demos and readings

Start with an existing institution and a person’s task. These examples identify possible difficulties and prototypes; the proposed tools are not claimed to be deployed by the institutions.

Download the research and civic-process guide (.md)

Democracy as an open-source project: historical sources

Institutional borrowing and later reforms

Adapted from Joshua’s Motivation 1, slide 3 of Self-Introduction.pptx. The diagram shows selected institutional influences. “Open source” is an analogy for studying and adapting rules; it does not imply equal access to political power or automatic improvement.

The 1787 constitutional compromise combined a House apportioned by population with two senators per state. US Senate

The 1848 Swiss Constitution established a bicameral federal parliament, using the United States as a model. Swiss Parliament: 1848

Australia combines parliamentary government responsible to the elected house, drawn from Westminster, with a federal Senate inspired by the United States. Australian Parliament

The Australian Constitution took effect with federation on 1 January 1901. Australian Constitution

The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 permit certain public bills to pass without Lords consent. The 1949 Act reduced the delay for eligible non-money bills from two years to one. Money bills and other categories have different provisions; the Lords did not lose every veto. UK Parliament

The optional federal legislative referendum dates to 1874. The mandatory constitutional referendum already existed in 1848. Swiss Parliament: referendums

The federal popular initiative for partial constitutional revision dates to 1891. The initiative for total revision predates this, going back to 1848. Swiss Parliament: initiatives

Preferential voting for the House of Representatives was introduced in 1918; compulsory voting at federal elections in 1924. Senate proportional representation was enacted in 1948 and first used in 1949, not at federation in 1901. Australian Electoral Commission

Political participation was historically restricted. Swiss women gained federal voting rights in 1971. Swiss Federal Archives

The US framers drew on British institutions and state constitutions. The connection represents selected institutional precedents, not a literal fork of modern Westminster government. US Senate: British and state precedents

Proportional election of the National Council was approved in 1918 and first used in 1919. Swiss Parliament: proportional National Council elections

Existing contexts and possible contributions

Swiss direct democracy

Process. A federal popular initiative proposes a constitutional change; an optional referendum challenges legislation.

A concrete difficulty. A voter or organizer needs to understand the text and the published procedural status.

Possible prototype. A comparison of the proposal with the status quo, or a tracker using official records.

Evaluation. Can a reader find the relevant passage and explain what is being proposed?

Popular initiatives · Referendums

ETH student representation

Process. Fachvereine and VSETH represent students in departmental and ETH-wide bodies; VSETH’s members’ council governs its own budget, elections and statutes.

A concrete difficulty. A student needs to identify who can act and what has already been discussed.

Possible prototype. An agenda brief or issue record connecting a concern, evidence, the responsible body and its response.

Evaluation. Can another student identify the responsible body and the present status?

VSETH politics · VSETH structure

Citizens’ assemblies and consultations

Process. Participants examine evidence, discuss alternatives and produce recommendations or consultation outputs.

A concrete difficulty. An important concern can disappear when discussions are summarized.

Possible prototype. A source-linked correction or unresolved-question record.

Evaluation. Compare the account with original contributions; count unsupported claims and missing requirements.

Irish citizens’ assemblies · vTaiwan · Murmi project

Participatory budgeting

Process. Develop proposals, assess feasibility and allocate a limited budget using a defined procedure.

A concrete difficulty. A proposer needs to meet requirements; a participant needs to understand how the allocation was produced.

Possible prototype. A feasibility checklist, comparison of rules, or readable allocation receipt.

Evaluation. Hold ballots and costs fixed for a rule comparison; ask a participant to explain an allocation.

Decide Madrid process · Komitee Equal Shares · Public KK26 receipts

Komitee handout: points, budgets and funding

The supplied Method of Equal Shares handout is a simplified example with invented data: three people each have seven points and CHF 1,000. The walkthrough follows the printed order and contributions. It illustrates budget exhaustion, not the full Komitee procedure or real allocation data.

Creative Club receives CHF 1,000, Experimental Event CHF 800, Dance Disco CHF 600 and Bilder Buch CHF 600. Auto Ausstellung and Folklore Fest are skipped. Each person spends CHF 1,000.

Open the original one-page handout (PDF) · Download the transcribed example (JSON)

Accountability after a decision

Process. Connect an adopted proposal to responsibility, implementation and public reporting.

A concrete difficulty. A resident can see that a proposal was approved but cannot tell what happened next.

Possible prototype. A proposal-to-implementation record using existing milestones and evidence.

Evaluation. Can a reader identify the current status, responsible body and supporting record?

Decidim accountability component

Research directions and selected papers

These fields overlap. The selection is a reading guide, not a chronology or an exhaustive map. Recent topics include AI-mediated deliberation, allocation with feasibility constraints and agents grounded in human self-reports.

Hélène Landemore: inclusive deliberation and cognitive diversity provides a political-theory starting point.

Computational social choice

Voting rules, proportional allocation and fair selection of representatives.

Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities

Peters, Pierczyński & Skowron · 2021 · NeurIPS
Peer-reviewed mathematical paper

Develops proportionality axioms and allocation rules for projects with different costs and additive utilities; a foundation for the Method of Equal Shares.

Limit. A guarantee depends on its preference model and precise axiom. It does not make every outcome fair under every definition.

Fair algorithms for selecting citizens’ assemblies

Flanigan, Gölz, Gupta, Hennig & Procaccia · 2021 · Nature
Peer-reviewed algorithms and deployment study

Optimizes selection probabilities among volunteers while meeting demographic quotas; evaluates fairness on data from ten assemblies.

Limit. Fairness within the volunteer pool does not solve unequal willingness or ability to volunteer.

A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities

Skowron · 2026 · arXiv:2602.08504
Preprint · February 2026

Proposes proportional rules for scored preferences under general feasibility constraints, and proportional rankings.

Limit. A theoretical proposal, not a deployment evaluation. Constraints and the definition of proportionality must be specified.

Generative Social Choice: The Next Generation

Boehmer, Fish & Procaccia · 2025 · ICML

Selects statements representing different groups under a text-length budget. Guarantees depend on formal preferences and query assumptions; a fluent summary alone does not establish fair representation.

Deliberative democracy

Inclusion, reason-giving, public judgment and legitimate authority.

Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups

Woolley et al. · 2010 · Science
Peer-reviewed empirical study

Two studies with 699 people found a shared factor in small groups’ performance across tasks, associated with social sensitivity and conversational turn-taking.

Limit. These associations do not show that equal speaking time causes better decisions, or measure democratic legitimacy.

How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect

Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer & Helbing · 2011 · PNAS
Peer-reviewed laboratory experiment

In numerical estimation tasks with 144 participants, seeing others’ estimates reduced diversity and increased confidence without a corresponding improvement in collective accuracy.

Limit. An estimation experiment is not a general verdict against discussion; task and interaction structure matter.

Polis: Scaling Deliberation by Mapping High Dimensional Opinion Spaces

Small, Bjorkegren, Erkkilä, Shaw & Megill · 2021 · Recerca
Peer-reviewed system and case study

Describes a system that maps agreement patterns and surfaces statements supported across opinion groups, with real consultation cases.

Limit. A useful map of participants is not a representative estimate of an entire population or evidence that consensus is always desirable.

Komitee Equal Shares: A Hybrid Algorithm for Priceable Participatory Funding

Yang, Scheurer & Helbing · 2026 · CHI Extended Abstracts
Published conference extended abstract · field deployment

Combines personal preferences with group evaluations and allocation receipts. In Winterthur in 2025, 38 citizens allocated CHF 380,000 to 43 projects.

Limit. One deployment, with 32 survey respondents. Simulated comparisons do not isolate every component’s causal contribution.

Human–AI interaction

How people use, question and correct AI assistance during participation.

AI can help humans find common ground in democratic deliberation

Tessler et al. · 2024 · Science
Peer-reviewed experiments

The Habermas Machine uses opinions and critiques to revise group statements. Across experiments with 5,734 participants, AI statements were preferred to those from human mediators.

Limit. Preference for a statement is not proof of factual accuracy, legitimate authority, or lasting political agreement.

Designing Digital Voting Systems for Citizens: Achieving Fairness and Legitimacy in Participatory Budgeting

Yang, Hausladen, Peters, Pournaras, Hänggli Fricker & Helbing · 2024 · Digital Government: Research and Practice
Peer-reviewed empirical article

Studies how voting-system design shapes citizens’ perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in participatory budgeting.

Limit. Perceived fairness and actual understanding are different outcomes; evaluate them separately.

Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems

Selbst, boyd, Friedler, Venkatasubramanian & Vertesi · 2019 · FAT*
Peer-reviewed conceptual paper

Explains how isolating a technical model from its social setting can undermine fairness goals.

Limit. A conceptual analysis of system design, not an empirical guarantee that a particular civic tool is fair.

Synthetic Replacements for Human Survey Data? The Perils of Large Language Models

Bisbee, Clinton, Dorff, Kenkel & Larson · 2024 · Political Analysis
Peer-reviewed empirical audit

Synthetic responses could match survey averages while understating variation and changing statistical relationships. Results were sensitive to prompts and collection dates.

Limit. The study tests particular models and tasks; use its evaluation questions rather than assuming identical failures for every later model.

Complexity science & collective intelligence

How group learning, coordination and judgment emerge from interactions, networks and feedback. Experiments on collective intelligence and social influence sit alongside models of interacting agents.

Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups

Woolley et al. · 2010 · Science
Peer-reviewed empirical study

Two studies with 699 people found a shared factor in small groups’ performance across tasks, associated with social sensitivity and conversational turn-taking.

Limit. These associations do not show that equal speaking time causes better decisions, or measure democratic legitimacy.

How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect

Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer & Helbing · 2011 · PNAS
Peer-reviewed laboratory experiment

In numerical estimation tasks with 144 participants, seeing others’ estimates reduced diversity and increased confidence without a corresponding improvement in collective accuracy.

Limit. An estimation experiment is not a general verdict against discussion; task and interaction structure matter.

LLM Agents Grounded in Self-Reports Enable General-Purpose Simulation of Individuals

Park et al. · 2026 revision · arXiv:2411.10109v3
Preprint · June 2026 revision of a 2024 paper

Builds agents from interviews and/or surveys of 1,052 Americans and evaluates predictions on held-out responses against people’s own test–retest consistency.

Limit. Predictive fidelity on studied tasks does not confer consent or political authority. The earlier title was Generative Agent Simulations of 1,000 People.

Belief Engine: Configurable and Inspectable Stance Dynamics in Multi-Agent LLM Deliberation

Yang, Flechtner, Dailisan & Bakker · 2026 · arXiv:2605.15343
Preprint · May 2026

Maintains explicit proposition-level stances with configurable evidence uptake and prior anchoring, recording the evidence associated with updates.

Limit. Evidence scoring and update rules are modeling choices. An inspectable trace is not by itself a faithful simulation of a citizen.

Project demos

Murmi and voting receipts open as embedded public pages. Offline view keeps local explanations and photos. The voting, opinion-group and summary exercises are labeled illustrations. Sources and further reading below support the four research directions.

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Choose a scene

Same proposals, different allocation rules

Original Aarau comparison: Equal Shares funded 17 projects across districts; a standard most-votes-first allocation would fund 7. Circle areas indicate project costs.

Original figure: Joshua C. Yang · Stadtidee Aarau, 2023. The right-hand map is a counterfactual comparison.